Might it have worked? Not according to former US general Joseph Votel. Al-Qaeda could have sunk the tankers, argues Votel, but this would not have destroyed the US economy. This is yet more evidence for Lahoud of the “vast chasm” between Bin Laden’s “global vision and the absence of the means by which to realize it”.
When the Seals assaulted the Abbottabad compound – built in 2005 – they discovered two of Bin Laden’s wives and multiple children and grandchildren. So high was the risk of discovery by drone or satellite that the children were not even allowed to play in the courtyard, nor did anyone have access to the internet or a phone.
It was a grim, self-sufficient existence. They kept goats, chickens and a cow, and relied sparingly on their two “security guards” – local Pakistani supporters – to buy other basic needs. “We bake our own bread,” wrote Bin Laden, “and purchase grains in bulk. Our regular shopping consists of fruit and vegetables.” Basic medicines were kept at the house, and doctors were consulted only in an emergency. Two of Bin Laden’s daughters, Sumaya and Mariam, played a key role helping their father with his public statements.
There is one final revelation. After Bin Laden’s death, the CIA claimed they were able to identify his compound by intercepting calls made by one of his Pakistani security guards, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. This, says Lahoud, was deliberate disinformation to protect the probable informant, Abu al-Harish al-Sindi, who was one of three trusted intermediaries between Bin Laden and his followers in North Waziristan. From the papers, Lahoud discovers that al-Sindi was arrested by the Pakistani security service, ISI, in January 2011. Bin Laden knew this, but took no precautions.
Interestingly, al-Sindi did not know that the author of the letters he carried was Bin Laden. The CIA were also uncertain, which is why “President Obama authorized the Abbottabad raid on a provability basis”. The CIA then lied about al-Kuwaiti’s involvement in their post-operation debrief to protect the real source, and because they had “a smaller but sizeable fish to fry”: Bin Laden’s deputy Atiya, who was killed by a drone strike four months later.
Lahoud’s story jumps around thematically, and is light on colourful narrative, but is never less than gripping.
By over-estimating al-Qaeda’s capabilities, and under-estimating those of other Jihadi groups (Islamic State, for one), the West paid a high price. In the end, concludes Lahoud, Bin Laden’s “repeated miscalculations meant that his leonine post-9/11 goals did not go beyond empty threats, unexecuted plans, and more than a little wishful thinking”.
The Bin Laden Papers by Nelly Lahoud is published by Yale at £18.99. To order your copy for £16.99, call 0844 871 1514 or visit Telegraph Books
