Whatever the Russian victory parade symbolizes, it will not be a victory over Ukraine, no matter how important President Putin and the Kremlin try to give it, military analyst Michael Clark writes.

This is a war in which Russia cannot win in any significant sense.

All of Putin’s military successes since 2008 have been achieved through small units of elite troops, mercenaries, local forces and Russian aircraft.

This gave Moscow considerable leverage during interventions in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, Libya, Mali and twice in Ukraine in 2014: first during the illegal annexation of Crimea, and then during the creation of self-proclaimed pro-Russian republics in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.

Each time, Russia acted quickly and ruthlessly, and the Western world could oppose nothing but gradual sanctions.

In February, Russia again tried to do the same in Ukraine – in 72 hours to seize power in a country with a population of 45 million and occupies the second largest area in Europe. It was an amazing and reckless adventure, and it failed miserably in the first crucial week.

At the moment, Putin has no choice but to move forward to further inflame the war, either in Ukraine or abroad. Escalation is inevitable, and Europe has approached a very dangerous moment in its recent history.

When Plan A’s seizure of power in Kyiv stalled, Moscow resorted to Plan B: take Kyiv into the ring, attack other Ukrainian cities – Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Mariupol and Mykolayiv, suppress Ukrainian military resistance, and threaten Kyiv surrender or destruction.

This also failed. Kherson has become the only large city that Russia controls with constant resistance from locals.

The fact is that the Russians did not have enough strength to capture such a large country; they acted very badly for a number of reasons: they commanded the troops poorly, were scattered on four separate fronts, from Kyiv to Mykolayiv, and did not have a single commander.

They were also opposed by a determined and well-trained Ukrainian army, which stopped them in a classic demonstration of “dynamic defense” – not holding the front line, but striking at points of maximum vulnerability.

In desperation, Russia has moved on to Plan C, which is to abandon Kyiv and the north and instead concentrate all its forces on Donbass and southern Ukraine, and possibly go as far as Odessa to close the country’s access to the sea.

This is exactly what we are currently seeing in the east in the area of Izyum, Popasna, Kurulka and Brazhkivka.

Russian forces are trying to surround Operation United Forces of Ukraine (JFO) – about 40% of its army, which since 2014 has strengthened against the “Luhansk and Donetsk republics”.

Russia’s main goal is to take Slavyansk and a little further south Kramatorsk. Both are important strategic points of control over the entire Donbass region.

And the war went into another phase – fighting in more open areas, in better weather, with tanks, mechanized infantry and artillery, which are designed to destroy enemy lines of defense before armored forces enter.

But doing so is not easy.

The Russian offensive began unevenly, and the Ukrainians are holding it back far from the frontiers that the Russian command expected to reach.

Ukrainians won precious time.

The so-called “heavy metal race” is underway – each side is trying to introduce its own heavy equipment before the active phase of the fighting begins.

However, what is happening in Donbass today gives Putin a bad choice – only between different types of defeat.

If by autumn the battle goes to a standstill, after heavy losses and pain he will have nothing to show.

And even if the Russians manage to capture the entire Donbas and the south, they will have to hold these territories in the fight against several million Ukrainians who will resist.

Any significant military success by Russia is likely to lead to the development of guerrilla movement and local resistance in the occupied territories.

In February, Putin went all-in with Plan A. Its collapse means that plans “B”, “C” or any other subsequent plans will force Russia to go all-in again – it will have to partially or completely suppress a large country.

One way or another, Russia will have to fight in Ukraine either against the local population or against the Ukrainian army, and quite possibly against both at the same time.

The West will continue to supply Kyiv with weapons and finances and will not lift strong sanctions on Russia in the near future. As soon as energy dependence on Russia decreases, the United States and Europe will be able to maintain destructive sanctions with little loss to their economies.

For Vladimir Putin personally, there is no going back, he can be tried as a war criminal. So his only political strategy is to turn the war in Ukraine into something else – Russia’s struggle against the “Nazis” and “imperialists” of the West who seek to destroy Russia.

Michael Clark is a Visiting Professor of Defense Studies at King’s College London .

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