Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military-political analyst of the Information Resistance group, in an interview with , analyzed the recent attacks on Russia by Iranian drones, made predictions as to whether the mass strikes will continue, as well as when the Armed Forces of Ukraine will launch a new counteroffensive and liberate all territories of Ukraine.

Let’s start with the New Year attack with missiles and drones on the entire territory of Ukraine. What was that?

Undoubtedly, it was primarily an attempt to spoil our New Year holidays. Here’s what’s interesting: the day before, they launched a massive attack on the territory of Ukraine and did not have time to fully stockpile the appropriate ammunition. As we remember, on December 31, they used 20 rockets. This is the ammunition that they managed to accumulate in two days after the massive strike. I don’t even know what they were guided by in this case, but if you think tactically and strategically like a maniac, especially with clear signs of schizophrenia, then you could have waited two days and had a much more massive strike. But they didn’t do it, they were in a hurry. They clearly had two completely different schedules. One is the schedule of attacks on critical infrastructure, the other is the schedule of terrorist acts for the New Year.

Because they had run out of air defense breakthrough ammunition, the multi-million scarce missiles have practically zero effectiveness, so they switched to mass drone use in the following days, and as a result depleted a large part of the second batch of Shahed.

A very important point. We saw that the first days of January had warm weather. Unusual for Kyiv +13, +15. In such conditions, the use of Shahed is more effective. Because their fuel system has a vulnerability before being used at low temperature. At -10 and -15, it can be used only after the appropriate refinement has already taken place in Russia itself. That is, they receive the batch and finalize it. They can refine the guidance system by adding their GLONAS units to increase the accuracy and range of effective use. And if we are talking about application in frost, then they refine the fuel system. It takes some time. So in December we saw a very different amount and very different time intervals between applications of Shahed.

MASSIVE STRIKES AND TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE RUSSIA CONTINUE

As Budanov said, Russia has missiles left for 2-3 massive strikes. Do you agree with this point of view? Before the New Year, “Iskander” flew to Chernihiv Oblast. What to expect?

These 2-3 times will never end. Since Russia has a production of missiles. In this case, Kyrylo Budanov says that Russia has received a sufficient stockpile of missile weapons since the time of the Soviet Union. Its warehouses and storage centers were breaking by 2022, but not all missiles were stored in ideal conditions. And many of them, which are not dozens, but hundreds of missiles, are in an unusable condition. Such a rocket can explode during launch. Currently, they are working on the finalization of these missiles – maintenance, repair. The number of combat-ready missiles is really limited. And even serviceable missiles must undergo some maintenance when they are removed from storage.

On average, Russia can prepare 5-7 missiles for use per day. 1.5-2 weeks are approximately the terms that are sufficient for them in the current conditions to form ammunition for a massive missile strike with a breakthrough in air defense and an increase in efficiency from this breakthrough.

Efficiency is also calculated very interestingly. It’s not just dry breakthrough percentages, it also depends on the objects they hit. I have repeatedly given an example. There was such a case in Odesa, when an Kh-59 missile broke through air defense and destroyed a toilet on the beach. In principle, the breakthrough is 100%, the efficiency of this breakthrough is 0%. Of course, vacationers may regret this “strategic destination and decision-making” facility. But in general, the effectiveness of such a breakthrough turned out to be zero. And this applies to the stock that they have.

Now we are repelled by the fact that it will end someday. In the near future, it will just end. And they remain only at the level of their own production. And it will depend on this in the future when they will be able to prepare ammunition for the task of a massive attack on Ukraine. It will not be 1.5-2 weeks. It will be 3-4 weeks, maybe a month. In the long term, we should talk about the fact that missile threats will not decrease. Mass strikes, if they correspond to their tactics of waging war against Ukraine, terrorist attacks will continue in the future. The time between these massive strikes will grow exceptionally.

You talked about the breakthrough of air defense. There is a version that they are launching Shahed in order to exhaust our anti-aircraft defense. How big should this version be?

Yes, of course they use Shahed even to make the air defense depletion happen. But first of all, we are talking about the echelon of a small radius of action. And these complexes are the most effective against Shahed. When they fail, the echelon’s medium range takes effect.

The NYT recently published a manipulative, unprofessional article that we are using expensive missiles to destroy the “cheap” Shahed. In that context, this article is outrageous. First, this Shahed can take human life. And even one human life is priceless. It cannot be compared with a rocket.

One more important point. On September 11, a very cheap terrorist act took place in the USA, but with the huge number of victims that followed it. And what funds were invested so that the US security service did not allow such a terrorist attack at all, and it happened? And then what funds were invested to destroy al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, including the introduction of troops into Afghanistan? Investing in the prevention of a terrorist threat always exceeds the ability of terrorists to carry this threat many times over. This is a very unprofessional article that outraged me.

COUNTER OFFENSIVE of the Armed Forces is maturing

How to understand Kirill Budanov’s statement about the spring counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Crimea to Donbas. Is this an appeal to the West that we are not going to sit out and should be given weapons? Is this an attempt to encourage Ukrainians that the front line is holding?

Wasn’t there a similar situation in 2022 on the eve of the counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region? For quite a long time, the front did not move at all. And after the Armed Forces pushed back the Russian invaders to the north and northeast, the impression was created that everything at the front froze. The line was stationary. Only subversive groups penetrated. Then, suddenly, a counteroffensive happened for everyone, which in a week and a half effectively freed more than 8.5 square meters. kilometers of the territory of Kharkiv region.

The fact is that someone was simply watching the front line, and someone was watching what was happening on this front line. And the conditions for this counteroffensive went along this line for almost three months.

The situation is similar with the right-bank Kherson region. The formation of conditions for a counteroffensive on the right bank began in May. And when was the right bank liberated? After almost five months of waiting. Although already in July, the Russian occupiers were supposed to make a “gesture of goodwill”. I said that July is indicative that their situation on the right bank is becoming more and more suicidal and stalemate. A stalemate with a suicidal outcome. And so it turned out. Even Surovikin, who said that some “very difficult decisions” had to be made, gave the order to flee from the Right Bank in just a month. They did not really want to leave there, but each time they understood that their stay there was impossible, because the conditions created by the Armed Forces of Ukraine forced them out of there.

Currently, a similar situation exists in the Zaporizhzhia region and even in the left-bank Kherson region. The situation in Luhansk Oblast is generally a mirror image of Kharkiv Oblast, in almost everything. I remember how I talked about Vovchansk, Kupyansk, Izyum – the logistical artery – about the importance of taking it under fire control and cutting it for the next counteroffensive. Accumulation of funds and forces in the Izyum area, the largest armored group in the entire combat zone in Ukraine. Now the same thing is happening in Luhansk region. Route R-66, Troitske, Nizhnya Duvanka, Svatov, Kreminna. Moreover, the process of cutting the Svatovo-Kremenna section is already under fire control. Accumulation of a large amount of forces and funds in the Svatovo-Starobilsk area. The only difference is that in the Kharkiv region, where the counteroffensive was launched, there was mostly a wooded area, which, of course, stimulated the results of our counteroffensive, assault actions, and mobile groups.

If the conditions for a counteroffensive have already been formed in Luhansk, then Zaporizhia is only maturing. For the most part, it is now about the accumulation of forces and funds in the Tokmak-Vasylivka-Melitopol triangle, but they are accumulating very interestingly. This reminds me of the situation with the right-bank Kherson region. When there was mass accumulation, when they were ready to make some very incomprehensible complex decisions. Then they tried to saturate the right bank with “chmobyks”, pulling professional units to the left bank. And now we see this saturation on this triangle… Of course, they are preparing for a counteroffensive of the Armed Forces.

And the Armed Forces are busy with regularly reducing their potential – warehouses with ammunition, with fuel and lubricants, placement of personnel, command posts, control posts. That is, they weaken their material and technical potential, as well as the management system.

There is also an interesting situation in the left-bank Kherson region. In fact, a 20-kilometer operational zone has now been formed there. I think you’ve all seen this strange video of the liberation of some island in the Dnieper… Let’s just say that this particular location, the gray area, is just entering this 20-kilometer operational zone where something can happen. And, starting in mid-December, the Russian command withdrew a significant part of its units from this zone to a distance of approximately 40 kilometers, because in this zone they are under constant fire pressure from the right bank of the Dnieper.

If today they use the “Grad” anti-aircraft missile defense system exclusively as a kind of Shahed for shelling Kherson or some other populated place on the right bank and immediately leave their position, then the Armed Forces of Ukraine destroy their objects and positions with high precision and long-range. This 20-kilometer operational zone includes Kinburnska spit, Gola Prystan, Oleshki, and Nova Kakhovka. That is, to the place where there is currently a limited contingent of Russian occupiers. Due to this fact, someone can take advantage of the situation, and something very interesting can start to happen there.

So this whole situation is really brewing. It will ripen in January. Maybe -15 will hit one of the locations in a few days. And these -15 will last at least a week, then this location will be fully ripe for a counterattack. Or there will be some other factors. In any case, winter will not pass for the occupiers in relaxation. The winter for the occupiers will be very hot.

They had a hot start to the New Year. In Makeev, there were explosions at the vocational school, such a New Year’s salute from HIMARS, and there were about 400 “two hundred”, about 300 “three hundred”. In the “swamps” it is simply impossible to howl about this. Although the Armed Forces of Ukraine repeatedly eliminated the enemy in such a precise manner. Why did Makiivka gain such publicity?

And how can it be hidden if it really is a record? The last time, how fast and record-breaking was the BTG destroyed during the fording of the Siversky Dinets, when the Russians tried to ford a small river and in less than 24 hours during this fording lost the BTG and more than 80 pieces of equipment. In this case, a few minutes – and there is no BTG, there is no ammunition, there is no such amount of equipment. In addition, it seems to me that it is not entirely correct to talk about losses now, because there is no building at all. In fact, it is difficult to say what the losses are – how many were killed, how many were wounded. They can be completely unprecedented. The detonating ammunition created an additional effect.

IN THREE MONTHS, RUSSIA LOST MORE THAN 47,000 PERSONNEL

Budanov and Reznikov warned that another wave of mobilization will begin in Russia on January 5, that the borders of both the Russian Federation and Belarus may be closed, and perhaps even martial law will be imposed on Russia. They predict 500 thousand, 1.5 million newly mobilized. They have different data every time. What will this mean for us? How will the situation at the front change? And what should be the reaction of Ukraine? In addition to the fact that we have threshed them and will continue to thresh them.

Ukraine’s reaction should be, and, in principle, it has already been announced by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyi, that our international partners should, of course, help us with this problem. That is, to give more weapons and ammunition. There are more targets to destroy, which is why you need the most of everything.

What about this partial mobilization. I am not a fan of calling it a new wave of mobilization. General mobilization in Russia began in September, and it was called partial. Just as they called the war some kind of special military operation. But what is the SVO, if it is a war? They replace concepts. And in the same way, they changed the concept of general mobilization.

Did they think 300 people would be enough? Mobilization began, 300,000 were collected in October – a record for destroyed occupiers. In November, a new record. In December – a new record. Three months in a row. Of course, this is due to the fact that a large number of unprofessional, untrained, low-quality servicemen who do not know how to behave in combat, and at the same time do not have a full complement of equipment and weapons units, have appeared in the combat zone . In three months, they lost more than 47,000 personnel. Taking into account the wounded, which are usually multiplied by the coefficient, since the beginning of the mobilization they have lost 150 thousand personnel, 50% of the mobilized. And somewhere before the end of February, all partially mobilized will be destroyed in total.

They need up to 50,000 personnel per month, including losses, and up to 50,000, including compensation for these losses. That is, they should have 100,000 resource updates in the war zone per month. And this is to simply be in one place, stand, not move. You can move, but “negatively” – back. Based on that, how much resource do they need to simulate an offense to get beyond those numbers? 200-250 thousand? Perhaps. In this case, they need 2-2.5 million mobilized during the year. Will they pull? They could not pull 300,000. What will they arm them with? Prigozhin’s sledgehammers? Perhaps. But given that we only have one HIMARS pack that destroys BTG in minutes, let’s just say… the imbalance is obvious.

Some experts say that the first “chmobyks” were untrained, did not know what to do and were simply cannon fodder, and those who will come in two or three months will be trained, will know what to do, and it will be more difficult for our guys to cope with them. Do you agree with this?

The beasts will come, the wolves of war. Disagree. Let me remind you what started the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian elite fought against us. And how did it all end for them? We crushed all this elite with difficulty, but still.

In order to train an elite, professional paratrooper, let alone a commando, is two months enough? No. Three months? Neither is there. In September, when this “partial mobilization” began, I was asked how long it would take for them to appear in the combat zone? Basic training takes two to three months. And then – they already appeared in October. And then I just grabbed my head. A month of preparation is nothing at all. It turns out they were collected, they drove and pounded all the way to the distribution point, they were distributed – they went to Ukraine and pounded, when they arrived – they were sent to the combat zone, to the positions of which they also drove and pounded, and then our artillery covered them. This is the “professional” level of preparation of this potential.

Those who are currently undergoing training and training at training grounds in Belarus and Russia are undergoing basic training, it will not give them any critical indicator of survival in a combat zone. It takes two to four years to train a professional soldier, the same paratrooper, depending on his training performance and the number of exercises, training and preparatory activities in which he participates. At the same time, colossal funds are invested in him so that he does not fire 10 shots from a machine gun, but a thousand, so that he has a maximum shot. , What is happening here at all. For example, the Carnation self-propelled gun will be distinguished from the T-80 tank. A self-propelled artillery installation will not be called a tank. And vice versa.

THE THREAT OF THE RUSSIAN OFFEND FROM BELARUS WAS, IS AND WILL BE

Predictions about a possible attack from Belarus are not silent. Arestovych gives such forecasts that they can go to Kyiv and to the west of Ukraine through the Volyn region in order to disrupt the logistics of the transfer of weapons. And our defense minister said that if they leave, it won’t be before spring. How realistic do you think this option is? I am not talking about the participation of Belarus in military operations, will the Russian troops dare to do so?

Currently, they do not have the resources on the territory of Belarus to invade Ukraine. Even the 12,000 that are there are not a resource that they can use even to seize a single region with a regional center. I will recall the situation at the northern bridgehead on February 24, almost 40 BTG elite units with the best equipment at that time entered. What will happen now? 12 thousand “chmobikes” with basic skills and catastrophic understaffing. In fact, these are 15 armored personnel carriers, their equipment is almost 500 units of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. Currently, there are about a hundred of them in Belarus. Catastrophic incompleteness. What is an offensive operation, if it is not a BTG, but a marching battalion?

If they want to launch an attack on Kyiv or any of the northern regions, then they need to increase their numbers to at least 40,000 in order to repeat at least the figure they had as of February 24. But even this indicator did not bring them success, despite all the eliteness, equipment and all this potential. That is, there should be an even greater number of personnel. 60-70-80 thousand, maybe 100 thousand. But such a number must first be placed in Belarus, equipped, and a huge number of questions arise here. They cannot fully equip and staff 12 thousand, and here we are talking about 100 thousand.

The threat was, is and will be, but now it can be stated that it is minimal. In the future, it can be implemented, but it will have absolutely no effect, they will only harm themselves.

MAINLAND OF UKRAINE CAN BE LIBERATED BY THE END OF THE YEAR

Military expert Seleznyov, analyzing Budanov’s predictions about the exit to the borders in May or August 1991, said that he was inclined to the second option. As a military expert, can you predict this date based on what is happening at the front?

There is always a positive scenario or a negative one. A positive scenario is, of course, an exit to the borders of 1991 by the end of 2023. But there is also a negative one. What is it? At the very beginning, we talked with you about preparing the conditions for a counteroffensive, which could last three, four, or five months, as in Kharkiv region and the right-bank Kherson region. And we talked about the fact that in Luhansk region these conditions are ready, but several factors are missing in order to implement counteroffensive actions. If we are talking about the Zaporizhzhia region, this process is currently taking place, as well as in the left-bank Kherson region. That is, everything is in process, two or three months and maybe something else will be implemented, let’s see.

We have seven locations that need to be liberated: the left-bank Kherson region, part of the Zaporizhia region, Luhansk region, occupied in 2022 and occupied in 2014, Donetsk region, occupied in 2022 and partially occupied in 2014, and partially occupied in 2014. If we are able to combine the liberation of Lugash Oblast in 2022, the liberation of the left-bank Kherson Oblast and Zaporizhzhia – in fact, this could happen by mid-summer, then the question arises of what to do with the territories occupied in 2014. There should be a completely different scenario and completely different preparation. The line of defense they have built up over the years will have a stifling effect on our counter-attack. And access to the administrative border with the temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula is also a peculiar element of influence. The planned destruction of the infrastructure facilities of the Russian occupiers on the peninsula and the destruction of the Crimean bridge in order to completely level logistics (a scenario similar to the Antoniv bridges in the Kherson region will take a certain period of time. In the context of all these locations, we arrive at the year 2024).

I do not rule out that in a negative scenario, we can liberate the mainland of Ukraine by the end of 2023. With the Crimean peninsula, history may move to 2024.

Kateryna Schwartz, Tala Kalatai