On the plane to Moscow, French President Emmanuel Macron revealed to several journalists that the idea of “Finlandising” Ukraine would be one among others on the table during his meeting with Vladimir Putin. Given the size of the table, as witnessed on social media, there may indeed have been an abundance of options on display. Macron later clarified he did not volunteer the suggestion, only offering it when probed by curious reporters, but by then it was too late to prevent an angry reaction in both Finland and Ukraine.

One could use a different term, as also suggested by Macron, but that is not really the issue. What perplexes me is how someone can offer Finlandisation as a reasonable compromise when that is exactly Putin’s bid in his Ukraine gambit. You do not suggest one party’s offer as the basis for a compromise, not if you have actually done any negotiating before.

When applied in Finland in the decades after 1945, the process was undeniably ugly. Finlandisation meant that Finland could preserve its nominal independence and democratic culture – but under severe constraints, not always openly displayed. Censorship of the media was widespread, certain political forces were kept out of power, historical knowledge was systematically falsified, and Finnish democracy buckled under pressure from a zealous and controlling Soviet regime next door. Even schoolbooks would be sent to Moscow for inspection. This was a diminished state, only accepting its subordinate status because it had no alternative.

In Ukraine, Putin will be seeking a similar arrangement. I suspect the Russian yoke in Ukraine will be far heavier than Soviet control in the Arctic. The Soviet Union removed its last troops from Finland in 1955; Putin may insist on having a permanent troop presence in Ukraine if and when an agreement with Kyiv is reached.

Ukrainian authorities have been adamant that what the Kremlin is demanding would lead to the effective destruction of the Ukrainian state. If the Minsk protocol from 2015 is applied according to the Russian interpretation of the text, the two occupied provinces in the east of the country might be reintegrated into Ukraine with a special status or special powers. Since they would remain under Russian control, the stratagem consists in dynamiting the Ukrainian state from within. Having to incorporate a foreign body into critical political decisions would be more than sufficient to weaken its capacity to act autonomously in the future.

In my view, the Kremlin is less interested in reconstituting a formal empire than in gaining freedom of action. Removing the obstacle of a strong and independent Ukrainian state means creating an open field for Russian business, political and military interests. This open field would extend all the way to the Polish and Slovak borders, inside the core of Central Europe. Europeans might want to reflect on the inevitable nature of that changed geography.

It was dispiriting to watch how Macron insisted on the Minsk protocol as a solution to the crisis. A solution it cannot be since Putin’s desire to impose Minsk on Ukraine is what created the crisis in the first place. Yet President Zelensky might not be able to shake off the pressure. Ukraine is highly dependent on financial and military support from the West. If leaders such as Macron or Biden decide to exert all their influence to force the Ukrainian president’s hand, can he stand firm? We will soon find out. 

Those countries, such as Britain, who are more suspicious of Minsk have an important role to play and should communicate to Kyiv that at least their support is not conditional on acceptance of President Macron’s plan. A simple phone call from Boris Johnson or Liz Truss could do wonders at this juncture, provided it touched on the essentials of the problem.

The current Russian regime is a lot less traditional than most think. Empire or glory have little appeal for Putin. He yearns for more and more freedom of action. His ambition in that sense is limitless and a country such as Ukraine stands as a particularly irritating obstacle. He would like to remove it, perhaps leaving a rump or a wreck in its place. This destructive strategy is what grants him an obvious superiority. There are many ways to destroy a state but few to build it. Putin can use Macron and others as blackmail tools. 

He can wait for concessions in Kyiv, and the political instability that would inevitably follow. He can try to precipitate a crisis with limited air and missile strikes and watch the desperate calls for a ceasefire. He can wait until the summer, as the tense military situation continues to bleed the Ukrainian economy and sap Zelensky’s popularity.

There is no obvious response to a strategy that is flexible and destructive. One thing seems clear. Ukraine needs support, an equal and opposite reaction to the forces weakening it.

Bruno Macaes is the former Portuguese Europe minister and author of Geopolitics for the End Time