There was no surprise invasion of Ukraine during this year’s Christmas festivities, as the Soviets did when they rolled into Afghanistan in 1979. But that doesn’t mean Western leaders should become complacent, for we still know from bitter experience that Vladimir Putin likes to surprise us. It’s just the way he works.

Putin is not some grandmaster of geopolitical chess, working out a long-range plan and sticking rigidly to it. He’s a judo fighter, an opportunist who creates chaotic and dynamic situations which can go in different directions. He then sees how they play out, striking when he sees the chance.

At the moment, after all, it is hard to know exactly what his goals may be. When Putin started building up troops on Ukraine’s borders in November, it looked like another attempt to make Kyiv subject itself to Moscow’s hegemony, whether by menace or muscle. This isn’t just imperialism: Putin genuinely seems to believe that Nato is a threat and that Ukraine is about to become its forward base.

The Russian president then raised the stakes further, making the issue not only about Ukraine but the whole architecture of European security. Moscow published two draft treaties that, if accepted, would block any expansion of the Nato military alliance, force the USA to withdraw its forces from Central Europe and even dramatically curtail the movements of its warships and bombers.

The Kremlin claimed that this was a take it or leave it offer, which it must know is entirely unacceptable to the West. To some, then, this is just a pretence at negotiation that can provide an excuse for escalation in early 2022, once Russia’s military contingent has been brought to what some US intelligence sources claim will eventually be 175,000 men.

That could be it, although there are easier and less inflammatory ways to manufacture a pretext. It could just as easily be an ambitious starting bid in a haggling process, or a massive and involved bluff, looking to secure some concessions from a West that Putin considers weak, distracted and divided. Or maybe it is a simple bid to scare Washington into putting pressure on Kyiv to get them to genuflect a little towards Moscow. 

We don’t know, really, because Putin himself is unlikely to know for sure. Military escalation is probably not his first choice. Even if his courtiers sugar-coat what they tell him (a former Russian spy once told me that they have learned “you do not bring bad news to the tsar’s table”), he must have a sense of its massive military, political and economic costs. Not least the fact that the Ukrainians would fight, and that there is no enthusiasm with the Russian public for war. 

Still, violence cannot be ruled out, especially since Putin is now desperate to rescue his tarnished reputation. In a recent poll, for instance, only 32 per cent of Russians said they would vote for him.

Instead of trying to work out what the plan might be, we ought to accept that there is a range of potential outcomes. Indeed, we should consider this an opportunity. The West’s response to these provocations can still influence his calculus, raising the costs of war but also making a negotiated de-escalation more palatable.

We may not be willing to put our own troops into harm’s way, but there are many other ways we can impose costs on Moscow. Beyond economic sanctions — which have their limits — there are other asymmetric moves, from intelligence activities to reaching out to the Russian public. But deterrence needs to be combined with diplomacy, and in that context it is important that Washington and Moscow have scheduled security talks for early January. 

Putin’s desperate desire to see his country recognised as a “great power” means he is at his most dangerous when he feels snubbed. Talking costs nothing, and can reap major rewards. All is still to play for.

Professor Mark Galeotti is Ernest Bevin Associate Fellow in Euro-Atlantic Geopolitics with the Council on Geostrategy and the author of “We Need To Talk About Putin”.