For the moment the continued jaw-jaw of diplomatic engagement suggests this is more a game of chess than Russian roulette. Putin has set out his list of demands, which essentially amount to the recreation of greater Russia in its old Soviet era and imperial form, or at least the sphere of influence Russia then enjoyed.

The demands include a ban on Ukraine entering Nato and a limit to the deployment of troops and weapons to Nato’s eastern flank, in effect returning Nato forces to where they were stationed in 1997, before their eastward expansion.

Joe Biden has pretty much ruled out full scale military retaliation, but warned Putin of “sanctions like he’s never seen” should his troops attack Ukraine. In the event, the sanctions so far proposed are rather less scary than those promised. In any case, the list of potential sanctions detailed in the draft submitted by Democrats to the US Senate, and apparently commanding the support of the White House, are not going to much bother Putin.

Certainly, they would make life difficult for Russia, and in the harshest form suggested, are likely to spark a destructive flight of capital. But they are not existential.

“Russia has quite a high pain threshold”, says Charlie Robertson, chief economist at Renaissance Capital, a London based emerging markets fund manager. “A robust external and fiscal position, abundant reserves, de-dollarisation and a well stocked counter-sanctions toolkit, make Russia a tough nut to crack”.

To have real impact, the West would have to do the same as it did with Iran, banning its exports of oil and gas, and removing Russia from the Swift international payments system. Neither of these actions looks realistic.

Now self-sufficient in energy, the US could possibly weather the storm, but the costs to the global economy in terms of higher, already stretched, international energy prices would be crippling. The pain would be most acutely felt in Germany, which is reliant on Russia for about 60pc of its natural gas. That dependency is being made worse by the imminent closure of Germany’s remaining nuclear power stations.

Small wonder that the German chancellery is incapable of deciding where it stands. It’s not just its dependence on Russian gas. Many Germans have a sense of affinity with Russia, “Russlandversteher” as it is called, which is deeply and culturally ingrained and at least as great as that felt for the West. More so than any other European country, Germany looks both ways.