The renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine has, rightly, resulted in widespread condemnation and outrage by the international community. Many countries have imposed sanctions on Russia, including individual sanctions on members of the regime and oligarchs linked to President Vladimir Putin, Western countries phasing out Russian oil and gas imports, and Russian banks being removed from the Swift financial payment messaging system. A range of companies including McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, and Apple have also stopped trading in Russia. In addition, countries have sent weapons to Ukraine which have frustrated Russian forces and helped inflict considerable casualties.

The fury of the international response and sheer scale of the sanctions have been immense and striking. This prompts the question of whether a precedent is being set here and a shift in international relations is taking place. Putin wanted to create a new world order where the use of force and border changes would be the norm, but has he inadvertently created the opposite world? Is there a new international consensus emerging that considers the large-scale use of force morally abhorrent and too costly? Will there be ‘a new birth of freedom’? 

The costs Russia is currently suffering does give leaders cause to think twice before starting a war in the future. Putin’s invasion has left him relatively isolated. Furthermore, far from showcasing Russian military prowess, Putin has exposed its weaknesses, and it’s hard for the rest of us to see Russia in quite the same way again. The war has also highlighted the general dangers of taking on small or medium powers, especially in a new Cold War context, where these states are armed with the weapons of their more powerful allies and sponsors. 

Analysts have argued that Russia’s war in Ukraine serves as a stark warning to Communist China in particular. If it invaded Taiwan, it would not only suffer greatly from similar isolation and sanctions, but it would be mounting amphibious landings in difficult terrain against a Taiwanese “porcupine” armed with anti-ship and anti-air weapons. 

However, we should not get carried away at this stage. The complacent liberal assumption that major war was fading away reduced our guard as conventional warfare was returning to Europe. We also still don’t know how this war will play out. We await the effects of sanctions, although Russia is trying to mitigate these through its relationships with other countries, including Iran, India, Pakistan, and especially China. 

Moreover, we await Russia’s next moves as it attempts to replenish its forces and supplies, and this next phase could be critical. There is also real concern that Russia could seek to end the war through an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, maybe even using unconventional weapons. It’s important to note that President Zelensky has already made concessions and he admitted on 15 March that ‘it must be recognised’ that Ukraine could not join Nato. In addition, it’s possible that other powers could learn from Russia’s mistakes and believe that they could pull off a better campaign. 

Finally, it’s worth noting that past debacles have not prevented subsequent ones. It may take a generation or two, but states recover, memories fade, and optimism often sets in. Countries may be reluctant to use force initially, but they gain more confidence after small victories. Russia invaded Ukraine despite the Soviet failure in Afghanistan, which contributed to the Soviet empire’s collapse. Britain went to the Falklands despite Suez. The United States went to war in Iraq and Afghanistan despite Vietnam, and some in the West are calling for some sort of intervention in Ukraine despite the fall of Afghanistan last year. Countries launch new wars despite or even because of their rivals’ mistakes. 

Circumstances, personalities, and ideas ultimately drag states into conflict, and the main international fault line will remain. Liberals will continue promoting democracy and sovereignty; authoritarians will advance autocratic rule and spheres of influence. Perceived historical claims to territory will also not disappear. 

It’s still very early days. However, the historian in me cautions against falling back into the thinking of the 1990s and believing that we are on the cusp of a new liberal age of relative peace. We must remember that states have always viewed military force as the ultimate tool of policy.

Dr Chris Newton is a military historian and defence analyst. He is also a former defence policy adviser to the Conservative Party.